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## Search the dblp DataBase
Vincent Conitzer:
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## Publications of Author- Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
**Automated mechanism design: complexity results stemming from the single-agent setting.**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] ICEC, 2003, pp:17-24 [Conf] - Vincent Conitzer
**Computational Aspects of Mechanism Design.**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] AAAI, 2005, pp:1642-1643 [Conf] - Vincent Conitzer
**Computing Slater Rankings Using Similarities among Candidates.**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] AAAI, 2006, pp:- [Conf] - Vincent Conitzer, Andrew J. Davenport, Jayant Kalagnanam
**Improved Bounds for Computing Kemeny Rankings.**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] AAAI, 2006, pp:- [Conf] - Vincent Conitzer, Jonathan Derryberry, Tuomas Sandholm
**Combinatorial Auctions with Structured Item Graphs.**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] AAAI, 2004, pp:212-218 [Conf] - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
**Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates.**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] AAAI/IAAI, 2002, pp:314-319 [Conf] - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
**Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness.**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] AAAI/IAAI, 2002, pp:392-397 [Conf] - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
**Computing Shapley Values, Manipulating Value Division Schemes, and Checking Core Membership in Multi-Issue Domains.**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] AAAI, 2004, pp:219-225 [Conf] - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
**Expressive Negotiation in Settings with Externalities.**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] AAAI, 2005, pp:255-260 [Conf] - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
**A Generalized Strategy Eliminability Criterion and Computational Methods for Applying It.**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] AAAI, 2005, pp:483-488 [Conf] - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
**Nonexistence of Voting Rules That Are Usually Hard to Manipulate.**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] AAAI, 2006, pp:- [Conf] - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Paolo Santi
**Combinatorial Auctions with**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]*k-*wise Dependent Valuations. AAAI, 2005, pp:248-254 [Conf] - Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, Kohki Maruono, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
**A Compact Representation Scheme for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments.**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] AAAI, 2006, pp:- [Conf] - Tuomas Sandholm, Andrew Gilpin, Vincent Conitzer
**Mixed-Integer Programming Methods for Finding Nash Equilibria.**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] AAAI, 2005, pp:495-501 [Conf] - Makoto Yokoo, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki
**Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments.**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] AAAI, 2005, pp:509-515 [Conf] - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
**Revenue Failures and Collusion in Combinatorial Auctions and Exchanges with VCG Payments.**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] AMEC, 2004, pp:1-14 [Conf] - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
**An Algorithm for Automatically Designing Deterministic Mechanisms without Payments.**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] AAMAS, 2004, pp:128-135 [Conf] - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
**Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges.**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] AAMAS, 2006, pp:521-528 [Conf] - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
**A technique for reducing normal-form games to compute a Nash equilibrium.**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] AAMAS, 2006, pp:537-544 [Conf] - Paolo Santi, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
**Towards a Characterization of Polynomial Preference Elicitation with Value Queries in Combinatorial Auctions (Extended Abstract).**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] COLT, 2004, pp:1-16 [Conf] - Vincent Conitzer, Nikesh Garera
**Learning algorithms for online principal-agent problems (and selling goods online).**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] ICML, 2006, pp:209-216 [Conf] - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
**AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents.**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] ICML, 2003, pp:83-90 [Conf] - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
**BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games.**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] ICML, 2003, pp:91-98 [Conf] - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
**Communication complexity as a lower bound for learning in games.**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] ICML, 2004, pp:- [Conf] - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
**Complexity of Determining Nonemptiness of the Core.**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] IJCAI, 2003, pp:613-618 [Conf] - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
**Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria.**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] IJCAI, 2003, pp:765-771 [Conf] - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
**Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard.**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] IJCAI, 2003, pp:781-788 [Conf] - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
**Definition and Complexity of Some Basic Metareasoning Problems.**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] IJCAI, 2003, pp:1099-1106 [Conf] - Makoto Yokoo, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki
**Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments.**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] IJCAI, 2005, pp:1668-1669 [Conf] - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
**Incremental Mechanism Design.**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] IJCAI, 2007, pp:1251-1256 [Conf] - Tuomas Sandholm, Vincent Conitzer, Craig Boutilier
**Automated Design of Multistage Mechanisms.**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] IJCAI, 2007, pp:1500-1506 [Conf] - Makoto Yokoo, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki
**A New Solution Concept for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments.**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] JSAI Workshops, 2005, pp:53-64 [Conf] - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
**Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core.**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2003, pp:230-231 [Conf] - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
**Expressive negotiation over donations to charities.**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2004, pp:51-60 [Conf] - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
**Automated mechanism design for a self-interested designer.**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2003, pp:232-233 [Conf] - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
**Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions.**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2004, pp:132-141 [Conf] - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
**Computational criticisms of the revelation principle.**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2004, pp:262-263 [Conf] - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
**Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with vcg payments.**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2004, pp:266-267 [Conf] - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
**Communication complexity of common voting rules.**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2005, pp:78-87 [Conf] - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
**Complexity of (iterated) dominance.**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2005, pp:88-97 [Conf] - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
**Computing the optimal strategy to commit to.**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2006, pp:82-90 [Conf] - Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang, Tuomas Sandholm
**How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate?**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] TARK, 2003, pp:201-214 [Conf] - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
**Complexity of Mechanism Design.**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] UAI, 2002, pp:103-110 [Conf] - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
**Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions.**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] Artif. Intell., 2006, v:170, n:6-7, pp:607-619 [Journal] - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
**Definition and Complexity of Some Basic Metareasoning Problems**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] CoRR, 2003, v:0, n:, pp:- [Journal] - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
**Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] CoRR, 2002, v:0, n:, pp:- [Journal] - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
**Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] CoRR, 2002, v:0, n:, pp:- [Journal] - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
**Complexity of Mechanism Design**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] CoRR, 2002, v:0, n:, pp:- [Journal] - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
**Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] CoRR, 2002, v:0, n:, pp:- [Journal] - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
**AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] CoRR, 2003, v:0, n:, pp:- [Journal] - Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang, Tuomas Sandholm
**How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate?**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] CoRR, 2003, v:0, n:, pp:- [Journal] - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
**BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] CoRR, 2003, v:0, n:, pp:- [Journal] - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
**Complexity of Determining Nonemptiness of the Core**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] CoRR, 2003, v:0, n:, pp:- [Journal] - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
**Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] CoRR, 2003, v:0, n:, pp:- [Journal] - Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer
**Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments.**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2007, pp:30-39 [Conf] - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
**Common Voting Rules as Maximum Likelihood Estimators.**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] UAI, 2005, pp:145-152 [Conf] - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Jérôme Lang
**When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate&quest;.**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] J. ACM, 2007, v:54, n:3, pp:14- [Journal] - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
**AWESOME: A general multiagent learning algorithm that converges in self-play and learns a best response against stationary opponents.**[Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP] Machine Learning, 2007, v:67, n:1-2, pp:23-43 [Journal] **Determining Possible and Necessary Winners under Common Voting Rules Given Partial Orders.**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**Voting on Multiattribute Domains with Cyclic Preferential Dependencies.**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**Optimal False-Name-Proof Voting Rules with Costly Voting.**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**Stackelberg Voting Games: Computational Aspects and Paradoxes.**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**Compilation Complexity of Common Voting Rules.**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**Complexity of Computing Optimal Stackelberg Strategies in Security Resource Allocation Games.**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**Computationally Feasible Automated Mechanism Design: General Approach and Case Studies.**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**Invited talk by winner of IFAAMAS Victor Lesser Distinguished Dissertation Award.**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison queries.**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms.**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**Anonymity-proof Shapley value: extending shapley value for coalitional games in open environments.**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**Undominated VCG redistribution mechanisms.**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**Strategic betting for competitive agents.**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**A multiagent Turing test based on a prediction market.**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**Stackelberg vs. Nash in security games: interchangeability, equivalence, and uniqueness.**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**Worst-case efficiency ratio in false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms.**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**Aggregating preferences in multi-issue domains by using maximum likelihood estimators.**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**False-name-proofness with bid withdrawal.**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**Strategy-proof allocation of multiple items between two agents without payments or priors.**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**Coalition Structure Generation Utilizing Compact Characteristic Function Representations.**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**Anonymity-Proof Voting Rules.**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**Limited Verification of Identities to Induce False-Name-Proofness.**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**Complexity of Unweighted Coalitional Manipulation under Some Common Voting Rules.**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**Multi-Step Multi-Sensor Hider-Seeker Games.**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**Finite Local Consistency Characterizes Generalized Scoring Rules.**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**Preference Functions that Score Rankings and Maximum Likelihood Estimation.**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**How Hard Is It to Control Sequential Elections via the Agenda?**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability.**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions with unit demand.**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently manipulable.**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**Computing optimal strategies to commit to in extensive-form games.**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**A qualitative vickrey auction.**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**A scheduling approach to coalitional manipulation.**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**Incentive Compatible Budget Elicitation in Multi-unit Auctions.**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**Limited verification of identities to induce false-name-proofness.**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**Anonymity-Proof Voting Rules.**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**An "Ethical" Game-Theoretic Solution Concept for Two-Player Perfect-Information Games.**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms.**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**Prediction Mechanisms That Do Not Incentivize Undesirable Actions.**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**Competitive Repeated Allocation without Payments.**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**Learning and Approximating the Optimal Strategy to Commit To.**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**Turing Trade: A Hybrid of a Turing Test and a Prediction Market.**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms.**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**Making decisions based on the preferences of multiple agents.**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]**Incentive Compatible Budget Elicitation in Multi-unit Auctions**[Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]
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