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Vincent Conitzer :
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Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm Automated mechanism design: complexity results stemming from the single-agent setting. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] ICEC, 2003, pp:17-24 [Conf ] Vincent Conitzer Computational Aspects of Mechanism Design. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] AAAI, 2005, pp:1642-1643 [Conf ] Vincent Conitzer Computing Slater Rankings Using Similarities among Candidates. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] AAAI, 2006, pp:- [Conf ] Vincent Conitzer , Andrew J. Davenport , Jayant Kalagnanam Improved Bounds for Computing Kemeny Rankings. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] AAAI, 2006, pp:- [Conf ] Vincent Conitzer , Jonathan Derryberry , Tuomas Sandholm Combinatorial Auctions with Structured Item Graphs. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] AAAI, 2004, pp:212-218 [Conf ] Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] AAAI/IAAI, 2002, pp:314-319 [Conf ] Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] AAAI/IAAI, 2002, pp:392-397 [Conf ] Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm Computing Shapley Values, Manipulating Value Division Schemes, and Checking Core Membership in Multi-Issue Domains. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] AAAI, 2004, pp:219-225 [Conf ] Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm Expressive Negotiation in Settings with Externalities. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] AAAI, 2005, pp:255-260 [Conf ] Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm A Generalized Strategy Eliminability Criterion and Computational Methods for Applying It. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] AAAI, 2005, pp:483-488 [Conf ] Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm Nonexistence of Voting Rules That Are Usually Hard to Manipulate. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] AAAI, 2006, pp:- [Conf ] Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm , Paolo Santi Combinatorial Auctions with k- wise Dependent Valuations. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] AAAI, 2005, pp:248-254 [Conf ] Naoki Ohta , Atsushi Iwasaki , Makoto Yokoo , Kohki Maruono , Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm A Compact Representation Scheme for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] AAAI, 2006, pp:- [Conf ] Tuomas Sandholm , Andrew Gilpin , Vincent Conitzer Mixed-Integer Programming Methods for Finding Nash Equilibria. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] AAAI, 2005, pp:495-501 [Conf ] Makoto Yokoo , Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm , Naoki Ohta , Atsushi Iwasaki Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] AAAI, 2005, pp:509-515 [Conf ] Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm Revenue Failures and Collusion in Combinatorial Auctions and Exchanges with VCG Payments. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] AMEC, 2004, pp:1-14 [Conf ] Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm An Algorithm for Automatically Designing Deterministic Mechanisms without Payments. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] AAMAS, 2004, pp:128-135 [Conf ] Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] AAMAS, 2006, pp:521-528 [Conf ] Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm A technique for reducing normal-form games to compute a Nash equilibrium. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] AAMAS, 2006, pp:537-544 [Conf ] Paolo Santi , Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm Towards a Characterization of Polynomial Preference Elicitation with Value Queries in Combinatorial Auctions (Extended Abstract). [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] COLT, 2004, pp:1-16 [Conf ] Vincent Conitzer , Nikesh Garera Learning algorithms for online principal-agent problems (and selling goods online). [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] ICML, 2006, pp:209-216 [Conf ] Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] ICML, 2003, pp:83-90 [Conf ] Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] ICML, 2003, pp:91-98 [Conf ] Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm Communication complexity as a lower bound for learning in games. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] ICML, 2004, pp:- [Conf ] Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm Complexity of Determining Nonemptiness of the Core. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] IJCAI, 2003, pp:613-618 [Conf ] Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] IJCAI, 2003, pp:765-771 [Conf ] Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] IJCAI, 2003, pp:781-788 [Conf ] Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm Definition and Complexity of Some Basic Metareasoning Problems. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] IJCAI, 2003, pp:1099-1106 [Conf ] Makoto Yokoo , Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm , Naoki Ohta , Atsushi Iwasaki Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] IJCAI, 2005, pp:1668-1669 [Conf ] Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm Incremental Mechanism Design. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] IJCAI, 2007, pp:1251-1256 [Conf ] Tuomas Sandholm , Vincent Conitzer , Craig Boutilier Automated Design of Multistage Mechanisms. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] IJCAI, 2007, pp:1500-1506 [Conf ] Makoto Yokoo , Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm , Naoki Ohta , Atsushi Iwasaki A New Solution Concept for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] JSAI Workshops, 2005, pp:53-64 [Conf ] Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2003, pp:230-231 [Conf ] Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm Expressive negotiation over donations to charities. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2004, pp:51-60 [Conf ] Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm Automated mechanism design for a self-interested designer. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2003, pp:232-233 [Conf ] Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2004, pp:132-141 [Conf ] Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm Computational criticisms of the revelation principle. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2004, pp:262-263 [Conf ] Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with vcg payments. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2004, pp:266-267 [Conf ] Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm Communication complexity of common voting rules. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2005, pp:78-87 [Conf ] Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm Complexity of (iterated) dominance. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2005, pp:88-97 [Conf ] Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm Computing the optimal strategy to commit to. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2006, pp:82-90 [Conf ] Vincent Conitzer , Jérôme Lang , Tuomas Sandholm How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate? [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] TARK, 2003, pp:201-214 [Conf ] Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm Complexity of Mechanism Design. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] UAI, 2002, pp:103-110 [Conf ] Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] Artif. Intell., 2006, v:170, n:6-7, pp:607-619 [Journal ] Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm Definition and Complexity of Some Basic Metareasoning Problems [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] CoRR, 2003, v:0, n:, pp:- [Journal ] Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] CoRR, 2002, v:0, n:, pp:- [Journal ] Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] CoRR, 2002, v:0, n:, pp:- [Journal ] Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm Complexity of Mechanism Design [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] CoRR, 2002, v:0, n:, pp:- [Journal ] Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] CoRR, 2002, v:0, n:, pp:- [Journal ] Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] CoRR, 2003, v:0, n:, pp:- [Journal ] Vincent Conitzer , Jérôme Lang , Tuomas Sandholm How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate? [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] CoRR, 2003, v:0, n:, pp:- [Journal ] Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] CoRR, 2003, v:0, n:, pp:- [Journal ] Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm Complexity of Determining Nonemptiness of the Core [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] CoRR, 2003, v:0, n:, pp:- [Journal ] Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] CoRR, 2003, v:0, n:, pp:- [Journal ] Mingyu Guo , Vincent Conitzer Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2007, pp:30-39 [Conf ] Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm Common Voting Rules as Maximum Likelihood Estimators. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] UAI, 2005, pp:145-152 [Conf ] Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm , Jérôme Lang When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] J. ACM, 2007, v:54, n:3, pp:14- [Journal ] Vincent Conitzer , Tuomas Sandholm AWESOME: A general multiagent learning algorithm that converges in self-play and learns a best response against stationary opponents. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] Machine Learning, 2007, v:67, n:1-2, pp:23-43 [Journal ] Determining Possible and Necessary Winners under Common Voting Rules Given Partial Orders. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Voting on Multiattribute Domains with Cyclic Preferential Dependencies. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Optimal False-Name-Proof Voting Rules with Costly Voting. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Stackelberg Voting Games: Computational Aspects and Paradoxes. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Compilation Complexity of Common Voting Rules. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Complexity of Computing Optimal Stackelberg Strategies in Security Resource Allocation Games. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Computationally Feasible Automated Mechanism Design: General Approach and Case Studies. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Invited talk by winner of IFAAMAS Victor Lesser Distinguished Dissertation Award. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison queries. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Anonymity-proof Shapley value: extending shapley value for coalitional games in open environments. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Undominated VCG redistribution mechanisms. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Strategic betting for competitive agents. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] A multiagent Turing test based on a prediction market. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Stackelberg vs. Nash in security games: interchangeability, equivalence, and uniqueness. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Worst-case efficiency ratio in false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Aggregating preferences in multi-issue domains by using maximum likelihood estimators. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] False-name-proofness with bid withdrawal. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Strategy-proof allocation of multiple items between two agents without payments or priors. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Coalition Structure Generation Utilizing Compact Characteristic Function Representations. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Anonymity-Proof Voting Rules. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Limited Verification of Identities to Induce False-Name-Proofness. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Complexity of Unweighted Coalitional Manipulation under Some Common Voting Rules. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Multi-Step Multi-Sensor Hider-Seeker Games. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Finite Local Consistency Characterizes Generalized Scoring Rules. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Preference Functions that Score Rankings and Maximum Likelihood Estimation. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] How Hard Is It to Control Sequential Elections via the Agenda? [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions with unit demand. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently manipulable. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Computing optimal strategies to commit to in extensive-form games. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] A qualitative vickrey auction. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] A scheduling approach to coalitional manipulation. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Incentive Compatible Budget Elicitation in Multi-unit Auctions. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Limited verification of identities to induce false-name-proofness. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Anonymity-Proof Voting Rules. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] An "Ethical" Game-Theoretic Solution Concept for Two-Player Perfect-Information Games. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Prediction Mechanisms That Do Not Incentivize Undesirable Actions. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Competitive Repeated Allocation without Payments. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Learning and Approximating the Optimal Strategy to Commit To. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Turing Trade: A Hybrid of a Turing Test and a Prediction Market. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Making decisions based on the preferences of multiple agents. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Incentive Compatible Budget Elicitation in Multi-unit Auctions [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Search in 0.005secs, Finished in 0.343secs