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Vincent Conitzer: [Publications] [Author Rank by year] [Co-authors] [Prefers] [Cites] [Cited by]

Publications of Author

  1. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Automated mechanism design: complexity results stemming from the single-agent setting. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ICEC, 2003, pp:17-24 [Conf]
  2. Vincent Conitzer
    Computational Aspects of Mechanism Design. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI, 2005, pp:1642-1643 [Conf]
  3. Vincent Conitzer
    Computing Slater Rankings Using Similarities among Candidates. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI, 2006, pp:- [Conf]
  4. Vincent Conitzer, Andrew J. Davenport, Jayant Kalagnanam
    Improved Bounds for Computing Kemeny Rankings. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI, 2006, pp:- [Conf]
  5. Vincent Conitzer, Jonathan Derryberry, Tuomas Sandholm
    Combinatorial Auctions with Structured Item Graphs. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI, 2004, pp:212-218 [Conf]
  6. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI/IAAI, 2002, pp:314-319 [Conf]
  7. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI/IAAI, 2002, pp:392-397 [Conf]
  8. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Computing Shapley Values, Manipulating Value Division Schemes, and Checking Core Membership in Multi-Issue Domains. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI, 2004, pp:219-225 [Conf]
  9. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Expressive Negotiation in Settings with Externalities. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI, 2005, pp:255-260 [Conf]
  10. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    A Generalized Strategy Eliminability Criterion and Computational Methods for Applying It. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI, 2005, pp:483-488 [Conf]
  11. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Nonexistence of Voting Rules That Are Usually Hard to Manipulate. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI, 2006, pp:- [Conf]
  12. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Paolo Santi
    Combinatorial Auctions with k-wise Dependent Valuations. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI, 2005, pp:248-254 [Conf]
  13. Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, Kohki Maruono, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    A Compact Representation Scheme for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI, 2006, pp:- [Conf]
  14. Tuomas Sandholm, Andrew Gilpin, Vincent Conitzer
    Mixed-Integer Programming Methods for Finding Nash Equilibria. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI, 2005, pp:495-501 [Conf]
  15. Makoto Yokoo, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki
    Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI, 2005, pp:509-515 [Conf]
  16. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Revenue Failures and Collusion in Combinatorial Auctions and Exchanges with VCG Payments. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AMEC, 2004, pp:1-14 [Conf]
  17. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    An Algorithm for Automatically Designing Deterministic Mechanisms without Payments. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAMAS, 2004, pp:128-135 [Conf]
  18. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAMAS, 2006, pp:521-528 [Conf]
  19. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    A technique for reducing normal-form games to compute a Nash equilibrium. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAMAS, 2006, pp:537-544 [Conf]
  20. Paolo Santi, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Towards a Characterization of Polynomial Preference Elicitation with Value Queries in Combinatorial Auctions (Extended Abstract). [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    COLT, 2004, pp:1-16 [Conf]
  21. Vincent Conitzer, Nikesh Garera
    Learning algorithms for online principal-agent problems (and selling goods online). [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ICML, 2006, pp:209-216 [Conf]
  22. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ICML, 2003, pp:83-90 [Conf]
  23. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ICML, 2003, pp:91-98 [Conf]
  24. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Communication complexity as a lower bound for learning in games. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ICML, 2004, pp:- [Conf]
  25. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Complexity of Determining Nonemptiness of the Core. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    IJCAI, 2003, pp:613-618 [Conf]
  26. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    IJCAI, 2003, pp:765-771 [Conf]
  27. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    IJCAI, 2003, pp:781-788 [Conf]
  28. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Definition and Complexity of Some Basic Metareasoning Problems. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    IJCAI, 2003, pp:1099-1106 [Conf]
  29. Makoto Yokoo, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki
    Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    IJCAI, 2005, pp:1668-1669 [Conf]
  30. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Incremental Mechanism Design. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    IJCAI, 2007, pp:1251-1256 [Conf]
  31. Tuomas Sandholm, Vincent Conitzer, Craig Boutilier
    Automated Design of Multistage Mechanisms. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    IJCAI, 2007, pp:1500-1506 [Conf]
  32. Makoto Yokoo, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki
    A New Solution Concept for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    JSAI Workshops, 2005, pp:53-64 [Conf]
  33. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2003, pp:230-231 [Conf]
  34. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Expressive negotiation over donations to charities. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2004, pp:51-60 [Conf]
  35. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Automated mechanism design for a self-interested designer. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2003, pp:232-233 [Conf]
  36. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2004, pp:132-141 [Conf]
  37. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Computational criticisms of the revelation principle. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2004, pp:262-263 [Conf]
  38. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with vcg payments. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2004, pp:266-267 [Conf]
  39. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Communication complexity of common voting rules. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2005, pp:78-87 [Conf]
  40. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Complexity of (iterated) dominance. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2005, pp:88-97 [Conf]
  41. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Computing the optimal strategy to commit to. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2006, pp:82-90 [Conf]
  42. Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang, Tuomas Sandholm
    How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate? [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    TARK, 2003, pp:201-214 [Conf]
  43. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Complexity of Mechanism Design. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    UAI, 2002, pp:103-110 [Conf]
  44. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    Artif. Intell., 2006, v:170, n:6-7, pp:607-619 [Journal]
  45. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Definition and Complexity of Some Basic Metareasoning Problems [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    CoRR, 2003, v:0, n:, pp:- [Journal]
  46. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    CoRR, 2002, v:0, n:, pp:- [Journal]
  47. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    CoRR, 2002, v:0, n:, pp:- [Journal]
  48. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Complexity of Mechanism Design [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    CoRR, 2002, v:0, n:, pp:- [Journal]
  49. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    CoRR, 2002, v:0, n:, pp:- [Journal]
  50. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    CoRR, 2003, v:0, n:, pp:- [Journal]
  51. Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang, Tuomas Sandholm
    How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate? [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    CoRR, 2003, v:0, n:, pp:- [Journal]
  52. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    CoRR, 2003, v:0, n:, pp:- [Journal]
  53. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Complexity of Determining Nonemptiness of the Core [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    CoRR, 2003, v:0, n:, pp:- [Journal]
  54. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    CoRR, 2003, v:0, n:, pp:- [Journal]
  55. Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer
    Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2007, pp:30-39 [Conf]
  56. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Common Voting Rules as Maximum Likelihood Estimators. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    UAI, 2005, pp:145-152 [Conf]
  57. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Jérôme Lang
    When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    J. ACM, 2007, v:54, n:3, pp:14- [Journal]
  58. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    AWESOME: A general multiagent learning algorithm that converges in self-play and learns a best response against stationary opponents. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    Machine Learning, 2007, v:67, n:1-2, pp:23-43 [Journal]

  59. Determining Possible and Necessary Winners under Common Voting Rules Given Partial Orders. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  60. Voting on Multiattribute Domains with Cyclic Preferential Dependencies. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  61. Optimal False-Name-Proof Voting Rules with Costly Voting. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  62. Stackelberg Voting Games: Computational Aspects and Paradoxes. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  63. Compilation Complexity of Common Voting Rules. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  64. Complexity of Computing Optimal Stackelberg Strategies in Security Resource Allocation Games. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  65. Computationally Feasible Automated Mechanism Design: General Approach and Case Studies. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  66. Invited talk by winner of IFAAMAS Victor Lesser Distinguished Dissertation Award. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  67. Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison queries. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  68. Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  69. Anonymity-proof Shapley value: extending shapley value for coalitional games in open environments. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  70. Undominated VCG redistribution mechanisms. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  71. Strategic betting for competitive agents. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  72. A multiagent Turing test based on a prediction market. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  73. Stackelberg vs. Nash in security games: interchangeability, equivalence, and uniqueness. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  74. Worst-case efficiency ratio in false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  75. Aggregating preferences in multi-issue domains by using maximum likelihood estimators. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  76. False-name-proofness with bid withdrawal. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  77. Strategy-proof allocation of multiple items between two agents without payments or priors. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  78. Coalition Structure Generation Utilizing Compact Characteristic Function Representations. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  79. Anonymity-Proof Voting Rules. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  80. Limited Verification of Identities to Induce False-Name-Proofness. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  81. Complexity of Unweighted Coalitional Manipulation under Some Common Voting Rules. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  82. Multi-Step Multi-Sensor Hider-Seeker Games. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  83. Finite Local Consistency Characterizes Generalized Scoring Rules. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  84. Preference Functions that Score Rankings and Maximum Likelihood Estimation. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  85. How Hard Is It to Control Sequential Elections via the Agenda? [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  86. Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  87. Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions with unit demand. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  88. A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently manipulable. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  89. Computing optimal strategies to commit to in extensive-form games. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  90. A qualitative vickrey auction. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  91. A scheduling approach to coalitional manipulation. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  92. Incentive Compatible Budget Elicitation in Multi-unit Auctions. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  93. Limited verification of identities to induce false-name-proofness. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  94. Anonymity-Proof Voting Rules. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  95. An "Ethical" Game-Theoretic Solution Concept for Two-Player Perfect-Information Games. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  96. Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  97. Prediction Mechanisms That Do Not Incentivize Undesirable Actions. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  98. Competitive Repeated Allocation without Payments. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  99. Learning and Approximating the Optimal Strategy to Commit To. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  100. Turing Trade: A Hybrid of a Turing Test and a Prediction Market. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  101. Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  102. Making decisions based on the preferences of multiple agents. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  103. Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  104. Incentive Compatible Budget Elicitation in Multi-unit Auctions [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


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