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Tuomas Sandholm: [Publications] [Author Rank by year] [Co-authors] [Prefers] [Cites] [Cited by]

Publications of Author

  1. Tuomas Sandholm
    An Implementation of the Contract Net Protocol Based on Marginal Cost Calculations. [Citation Graph (1, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI, 1993, pp:256-262 [Conf]
  2. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Automated mechanism design: complexity results stemming from the single-agent setting. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ICEC, 2003, pp:17-24 [Conf]
  3. Martin Andersson, Tuomas Sandholm
    Leveled Commitment Contracts with Myopic and Strategic Agents. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI/IAAI, 1998, pp:38-45 [Conf]
  4. Martin Andersson, Tuomas Sandholm
    Time-Quality Tradeoffs in Reallocative Negotiation with Combinatorial Contract Types. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI/IAAI, 1999, pp:3-10 [Conf]
  5. Michael Benisch, George Davis, Tuomas Sandholm
    Algorithms for Rationalizability and CURB Sets. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI, 2006, pp:- [Conf]
  6. Craig Boutilier, Tuomas Sandholm, Rob Shields
    Eliciting Bid Taker Non-price Preferences in (Combinatorial) Auctions. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI, 2004, pp:204-211 [Conf]
  7. Sviatoslav Brainov, Tuomas Sandholm
    Power, Dependence and Stability in Multiagent Plans. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI/IAAI, 1999, pp:11-16 [Conf]
  8. Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm
    Partial-Revelation VCG Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI/IAAI, 2002, pp:367-372 [Conf]
  9. Vincent Conitzer, Jonathan Derryberry, Tuomas Sandholm
    Combinatorial Auctions with Structured Item Graphs. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI, 2004, pp:212-218 [Conf]
  10. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI/IAAI, 2002, pp:314-319 [Conf]
  11. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI/IAAI, 2002, pp:392-397 [Conf]
  12. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Computing Shapley Values, Manipulating Value Division Schemes, and Checking Core Membership in Multi-Issue Domains. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI, 2004, pp:219-225 [Conf]
  13. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Expressive Negotiation in Settings with Externalities. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI, 2005, pp:255-260 [Conf]
  14. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    A Generalized Strategy Eliminability Criterion and Computational Methods for Applying It. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI, 2005, pp:483-488 [Conf]
  15. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Nonexistence of Voting Rules That Are Usually Hard to Manipulate. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI, 2006, pp:- [Conf]
  16. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Paolo Santi
    Combinatorial Auctions with k-wise Dependent Valuations. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI, 2005, pp:248-254 [Conf]
  17. Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm
    Optimal Rhode Island Hold'em Poker. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI, 2005, pp:1684-1685 [Conf]
  18. Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm
    A Competitive Texas Hold'em Poker Player via Automated Abstraction and Real-Time Equilibrium Computation. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI, 2006, pp:- [Conf]
  19. Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm
    Deliberation in Equilibrium: Bargaining in Computationally Complex Problems. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI/IAAI, 2000, pp:48-55 [Conf]
  20. Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm
    Using Performance Profile Trees to Improve Deliberation Control. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI, 2004, pp:73-79 [Conf]
  21. Anton Likhodedov, Tuomas Sandholm
    Methods for Boosting Revenue in Combinatorial Auctions. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI, 2004, pp:232-237 [Conf]
  22. Anton Likhodedov, Tuomas Sandholm
    Approximating Revenue-Maximizing Combinatorial Auctions. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI, 2005, pp:267-274 [Conf]
  23. Daniel E. Neiman, David W. Hildum, Victor R. Lesser, Tuomas Sandholm
    Exploiting Meta-Level information in a Distributed Scheduling System. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI, 1994, pp:394-400 [Conf]
  24. Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, Kohki Maruono, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    A Compact Representation Scheme for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI, 2006, pp:- [Conf]
  25. Tuomas Sandholm
    Expressive Commerce and Its Application to Sourcing. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI, 2006, pp:- [Conf]
  26. Tuomas Sandholm
    A Second Order Parameter for 3SAT. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI/IAAI, Vol. 1, 1996, pp:259-265 [Conf]
  27. Tuomas Sandholm
    eMediator: a Next Generation Electronic Commerce Server. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI/IAAI, 1999, pp:923-924 [Conf]
  28. Tuomas Sandholm, Andrew Gilpin, Vincent Conitzer
    Mixed-Integer Programming Methods for Finding Nash Equilibria. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI, 2005, pp:495-501 [Conf]
  29. Tuomas Sandholm, Victor R. Lesser
    Advantages of a Leveled Commitment Contracting Protocol. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI/IAAI, Vol. 1, 1996, pp:126-133 [Conf]
  30. Tuomas Sandholm, Kate Larson, Martin Andersson, Onn Shehory, Fernando Tohmé
    Anytime Coalition Structure Generation with Worst Case Guarantees. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI/IAAI, 1998, pp:46-53 [Conf]
  31. Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri
    Improved Algorithms for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions and Generalizations. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI/IAAI, 2000, pp:90-97 [Conf]
  32. Tuomas Sandholm, Nir Vulkan
    Bargaining with Deadlines. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI/IAAI, 1999, pp:44-51 [Conf]
  33. Tuomas Sandholm, Xiao Feng Wang
    (Im)possibility of Safe Exchange Mechanism Design. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI/IAAI, 2002, pp:338-344 [Conf]
  34. Makoto Yokoo, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki
    Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI, 2005, pp:509-515 [Conf]
  35. Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm
    Anytime Coalition Structure Generation: An Average Case Study. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    Agents, 1999, pp:40-47 [Conf]
  36. Hyacinth S. Nwana, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein, Tuomas Sandholm, Carles Sierra, Pattie Maes, Robert H. Guttman
    Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: Issues, Challenges and Some Viewpoints. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    Agents, 1998, pp:189-196 [Conf]
  37. Tuomas Sandholm
    eMediator: a next generation electronic commerce server. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    Agents, 2000, pp:341-348 [Conf]
  38. Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm
    Differential -Revelation VCG Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AMEC, 2002, pp:34-51 [Conf]
  39. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Revenue Failures and Collusion in Combinatorial Auctions and Exchanges with VCG Payments. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AMEC, 2004, pp:1-14 [Conf]
  40. Benoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm
    Effectiveness of Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AMEC, 2002, pp:69-86 [Conf]
  41. Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm
    Designing Auctions for Deliberative Agents. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AMEC, 2004, pp:87-100 [Conf]
  42. Anton Likhodedov, Tuomas Sandholm
    Mechanism for Optimally Trading Off Revenue and Efficiency in Multi-unit Auctions. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AMEC, 2003, pp:92-108 [Conf]
  43. Tuomas Sandholm, Andrew Gilpin
    Sequences of Take-It-or-Leave-It Offers: Near-Optimal Auctions Without Full Valuation Revelation. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AMEC, 2003, pp:73-91 [Conf]
  44. Martin Andersson, Tuomas Sandholm
    Sequencing of Contract Types for Anytime Task Reallocation. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AMET, 1998, pp:54-69 [Conf]
  45. Sviatoslav Braynov, Tuomas Sandholm
    Incentive compatible mechanism for trust revelation. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAMAS, 2002, pp:310-311 [Conf]
  46. Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm
    Im)Possibility of Unconditionally Privacy-Preserving Auctions. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAMAS, 2004, pp:810-817 [Conf]
  47. Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm
    Decentralized voting with unconditional privacy. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAMAS, 2005, pp:357-364 [Conf]
  48. Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm
    Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAMAS, 2002, pp:168-169 [Conf]
  49. Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm
    Anonymous Pricing of Efficient Allocations in Combinatorial Economies. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAMAS, 2004, pp:254-260 [Conf]
  50. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    An Algorithm for Automatically Designing Deterministic Mechanisms without Payments. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAMAS, 2004, pp:128-135 [Conf]
  51. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAMAS, 2006, pp:521-528 [Conf]
  52. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    A technique for reducing normal-form games to compute a Nash equilibrium. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAMAS, 2006, pp:537-544 [Conf]
  53. Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm
    Information-theoretic approaches to branching in search. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAMAS, 2006, pp:545-547 [Conf]
  54. Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm
    A Texas Hold'em poker player based on automated abstraction and real-time equilibrium computation. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAMAS, 2006, pp:1453-1454 [Conf]
  55. Benoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm
    Generalizing preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAMAS, 2003, pp:1014-1015 [Conf]
  56. Benoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm
    Effectiveness of Query Types and Policies for Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAMAS, 2004, pp:386-393 [Conf]
  57. Anshul Kothari, Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri
    Solving Combinatorial Exchanges: Optimality via a Few Partial Bids. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAMAS, 2004, pp:1418-1419 [Conf]
  58. Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm
    An alternating offers bargaining model for computationally limited agents. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAMAS, 2002, pp:135-142 [Conf]
  59. Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm
    Bidders with hard valuation problems. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAMAS, 2002, pp:160-161 [Conf]
  60. Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm
    Miscomputing ratio: social cost of selfish computing. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAMAS, 2003, pp:273-280 [Conf]
  61. Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm
    Experiments on Deliberation Equilibria in Auctions. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAMAS, 2004, pp:394-401 [Conf]
  62. Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm
    Mechanism design and deliberative agents. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAMAS, 2005, pp:650-656 [Conf]
  63. Tuomas Sandholm, Andrew Gilpin
    Sequences of take-it-or-leave-it offers: near-optimal auctions without full valuation revelation. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAMAS, 2006, pp:1127-1134 [Conf]
  64. Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri, Andrew Gilpin, David Levine
    Winner determination in combinatorial auction generalizations. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAMAS, 2002, pp:69-76 [Conf]
  65. Tuomas Sandholm
    Agents in Electronic Commerce: Component Technologies for Automated Negation and Coalition Formation. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    CIA, 1998, pp:113-134 [Conf]
  66. Avrim Blum, Jeffrey C. Jackson, Tuomas Sandholm, Martin Zinkevich
    Preference Elicitation and Query Learning. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    COLT, 2003, pp:13-25 [Conf]
  67. Paolo Santi, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Towards a Characterization of Polynomial Preference Elicitation with Value Queries in Combinatorial Auctions (Extended Abstract). [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    COLT, 2004, pp:1-16 [Conf]
  68. Tuomas Sandholm
    Automated Mechanism Design: A New Application Area for Search Algorithms. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    CP, 2003, pp:19-36 [Conf]
  69. Tuomas Sandholm
    Terminating Decision Algorithms Optimally. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    CP, 2003, pp:950-955 [Conf]
  70. Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm, Yoav Shoham
    Spiteful Bidding in Sealed-Bid Auctions. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    Computing and Markets, 2005, pp:- [Conf]
  71. Daniel J. Lehmann, Rudolf Müller, Tuomas Sandholm
    05011 Executive Summary - Computing and Markets. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    Computing and Markets, 2005, pp:- [Conf]
  72. Daniel J. Lehmann, Rudolf Müller, Tuomas Sandholm
    05011 Abstracts Collection - Computing and Markets. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    Computing and Markets, 2005, pp:- [Conf]
  73. Tuomas Sandholm
    Automated Mechanism Design. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    Computing and Markets, 2005, pp:- [Conf]
  74. Tuomas Sandholm, Andrew Gilpin
    Sequences of Take-It-or-Leave-It Offers: Near-Optimal Auctions Without Full Valuation Revelation. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    Computing and Markets, 2005, pp:- [Conf]
  75. Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm
    Efficient Privacy-Preserving Protocols for Multi-unit Auctions. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    Financial Cryptography, 2005, pp:298-312 [Conf]
  76. Martin Andersson, Tuomas Sandholm
    Contract Type Sequencing for Reallocative Negotiation. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ICDCS, 2000, pp:154-160 [Conf]
  77. Martin Andersson, Tuomas Sandholm
    Leveled Commitment Contracting among Myopic Individually Rational Agents. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ICMAS, 1998, pp:26-33 [Conf]
  78. Sviatoslav Brainov, Tuomas Sandholm
    Reasoning About Others: Representing and Processing Infinite Belief Hierarchies. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ICMAS, 2000, pp:71-78 [Conf]
  79. Tuomas Sandholm
    Agents in Electronic Commerce: Component Technologies for Automated Negotiation and Coalition Formation. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ICMAS, 1998, pp:10-11 [Conf]
  80. Tuomas Sandholm, Vincent Ferrandon
    Safe Exchange Planner. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ICMAS, 2000, pp:255-262 [Conf]
  81. Tuomas Sandholm, Victor R. Lesser
    Issues in Automated Negotiation and Electronic Commerce: Extending the Contract Net Framework. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ICMAS, 1995, pp:328-335 [Conf]
  82. Tuomas Sandholm, Yunhong Zhou
    Surplus Equivalence of Leveled Commitment Contracts. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ICMAS, 2000, pp:247-254 [Conf]
  83. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ICML, 2003, pp:83-90 [Conf]
  84. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ICML, 2003, pp:91-98 [Conf]
  85. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Communication complexity as a lower bound for learning in games. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ICML, 2004, pp:- [Conf]
  86. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Complexity of Determining Nonemptiness of the Core. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    IJCAI, 2003, pp:613-618 [Conf]
  87. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    IJCAI, 2003, pp:765-771 [Conf]
  88. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    IJCAI, 2003, pp:781-788 [Conf]
  89. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Definition and Complexity of Some Basic Metareasoning Problems. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    IJCAI, 2003, pp:1099-1106 [Conf]
  90. Tuomas Sandholm
    Making Markets and Democracy Work: A Story of Incentives and Computing. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    IJCAI, 2003, pp:1649-0 [Conf]
  91. Tuomas Sandholm
    An Algorithm for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    IJCAI, 1999, pp:542-547 [Conf]
  92. Tuomas Sandholm, Robert H. Crites
    On Multiagent Q-Learning in a Semi-Competitive Domain. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    Adaption and Learning in Multi-Agent Systems, 1995, pp:191-205 [Conf]
  93. Tuomas Sandholm, Victor R. Lesser
    Coalition Formation among Bounded Rational Agents. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    IJCAI (1), 1995, pp:662-671 [Conf]
  94. Tuomas Sandholm, Victor R. Lesser
    Equilibrium Analysis of the Possibilities of Unenforced Exchange in Multiagent Systems. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    IJCAI (1), 1995, pp:694-703 [Conf]
  95. Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri
    Market Clearability. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    IJCAI, 2001, pp:1145-1151 [Conf]
  96. Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri, Andrew Gilpin, David Levine
    CABOB: A Fast Optimal Algorithm for Combinatorial Auctions. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    IJCAI, 2001, pp:1102-1108 [Conf]
  97. Tuomas Sandholm, Sandeep Sikka, Samphel Norden
    Algorithms for Optimizing Leveled Commitment Contracts. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    IJCAI, 1999, pp:535-541 [Conf]
  98. Tuomas Sandholm, Fredrik Ygge
    On the Gains and Losses of Speculation in Equilibrium Markets. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    IJCAI (1), 1997, pp:632-639 [Conf]
  99. Makoto Yokoo, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki
    Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    IJCAI, 2005, pp:1668-1669 [Conf]
  100. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Incremental Mechanism Design. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    IJCAI, 2007, pp:1251-1256 [Conf]
  101. Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm
    Information-Theoretic Approaches to Branching in Search. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    IJCAI, 2007, pp:2286-2292 [Conf]
  102. Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm, Yoav Shoham
    Spiteful Bidding in Sealed-Bid Auctions. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    IJCAI, 2007, pp:1207-1214 [Conf]
  103. Tuomas Sandholm, Vincent Conitzer, Craig Boutilier
    Automated Design of Multistage Mechanisms. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    IJCAI, 2007, pp:1500-1506 [Conf]
  104. Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri
    Market Clearing with Supply and Demand Curves. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ISAAC, 2002, pp:600-611 [Conf]
  105. Makoto Yokoo, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki
    A New Solution Concept for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    JSAI Workshops, 2005, pp:53-64 [Conf]
  106. XiaoFeng Wang, Tuomas Sandholm
    Reinforcement Learning to Play an Optimal Nash Equilibrium in Team Markov Games. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    NIPS, 2002, pp:1571-1578 [Conf]
  107. Xiao Feng Wang, Tuomas Sandholm
    Learning Near-Pareto-Optimal Conventions in Polynomial Time. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    NIPS, 2003, pp:- [Conf]
  108. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2003, pp:230-231 [Conf]
  109. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Expressive negotiation over donations to charities. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2004, pp:51-60 [Conf]
  110. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Automated mechanism design for a self-interested designer. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2003, pp:232-233 [Conf]
  111. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2004, pp:132-141 [Conf]
  112. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Computational criticisms of the revelation principle. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2004, pp:262-263 [Conf]
  113. Sviatoslav Brainov, Tuomas Sandholm
    Contracting with uncertain level of trust. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 1999, pp:15-21 [Conf]
  114. Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm
    Finding equilibria in large sequential games of imperfect information. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2006, pp:160-169 [Conf]
  115. Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm
    Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2003, pp:196-197 [Conf]
  116. Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm
    Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2001, pp:256-259 [Conf]
  117. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with vcg payments. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2004, pp:266-267 [Conf]
  118. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Communication complexity of common voting rules. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2005, pp:78-87 [Conf]
  119. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Complexity of (iterated) dominance. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2005, pp:88-97 [Conf]
  120. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Computing the optimal strategy to commit to. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2006, pp:82-90 [Conf]
  121. Benoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm
    Using value queries in combinatorial auctions. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2003, pp:226-227 [Conf]
  122. Anshul Kothari, Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri
    Solving combinatorial exchanges: optimality via a few partial bids. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2003, pp:236-237 [Conf]
  123. Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm
    Strategic deliberation and truthful revelation: an impossibility result. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2004, pp:264-265 [Conf]
  124. Anton Likhodedov, Tuomas Sandholm
    Auction mechanism for optimally trading off revenue and efficiency. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2003, pp:212-213 [Conf]
  125. Anton Likhodedov, Tuomas Sandholm
    Mechanism for optimally trading off revenue and efficiency in multi-unit auctions. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2004, pp:268-269 [Conf]
  126. Martin Zinkevich, Avrim Blum, Tuomas Sandholm
    On polynomial-time preference elicitation with value queries. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2003, pp:176-185 [Conf]
  127. Avrim Blum, Tuomas Sandholm, Martin Zinkevich
    Online algorithms for market clearing. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    SODA, 2002, pp:971-980 [Conf]
  128. Subhash Suri, Tuomas Sandholm, Priyank Ramesh Warkhede
    Optimal Flow Aggregation. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    SWAT, 2000, pp:462-475 [Conf]
  129. Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm
    Unconditional privacy in social choice. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    TARK, 2005, pp:207-218 [Conf]
  130. Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang, Tuomas Sandholm
    How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate? [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    TARK, 2003, pp:201-214 [Conf]
  131. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Complexity of Mechanism Design. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    UAI, 2002, pp:103-110 [Conf]
  132. Sviatoslav Braynov, Tuomas Sandholm
    Auctions with Untrustworthy Bidders. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    CEC, 2003, pp:363-0 [Conf]
  133. Tuomas Sandholm
    Agents in Electronic Commerce: Component Technologies for Automated Negation and Coalition Formation. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 2000, v:3, n:1, pp:73-96 [Journal]
  134. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    Artif. Intell., 2006, v:170, n:6-7, pp:607-619 [Journal]
  135. Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm
    Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibrium. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    Artif. Intell., 2001, v:132, n:2, pp:183-217 [Journal]
  136. Tuomas Sandholm
    Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    Artif. Intell., 2002, v:135, n:1-2, pp:1-54 [Journal]
  137. Tuomas Sandholm, Victor R. Lesser
    Coalitions Among Computationally Bounded Agents. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    Artif. Intell., 1997, v:94, n:1-2, pp:99-137 [Journal]
  138. Tuomas Sandholm, Kate Larson, Martin Andersson, Onn Shehory, Fernando Tohmé
    Coalition Structure Generation with Worst Case Guarantees. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    Artif. Intell., 1999, v:111, n:1-2, pp:209-238 [Journal]
  139. Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri
    BOB: Improved winner determination in combinatorial auctions and generalizations. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    Artif. Intell., 2003, v:145, n:1-2, pp:33-58 [Journal]
  140. Tuomas Sandholm, Yunhong Zhou
    Surplus equivalence of leveled commitment contracts. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    Artif. Intell., 2002, v:142, n:2, pp:239-264 [Journal]
  141. Tuomas Sandholm, Victor R. Lesser
    Leveled-Commitment Contracting: A Backtracking Instrument for Multiagent Systems. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AI Magazine, 2002, v:23, n:3, pp:89-100 [Journal]
  142. Subhash Suri, Tuomas Sandholm, Priyank Ramesh Warkhede
    Compressing Two-Dimensional Routing Tables. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    Algorithmica, 2003, v:35, n:4, pp:287-300 [Journal]
  143. Tuomas Sandholm
    Automated Negotiation. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    Commun. ACM, 1999, v:42, n:3, pp:84-85 [Journal]
  144. Sviatoslav Braynov, Tuomas Sandholm
    Contracting With Uncertain Level Of Trust. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    Computational Intelligence, 2002, v:18, n:4, pp:501-514 [Journal]
  145. Tuomas Sandholm
    eMediator: A Next Generation Electronic Commerce Server. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    Computational Intelligence, 2002, v:18, n:4, pp:656-676 [Journal]
  146. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Definition and Complexity of Some Basic Metareasoning Problems [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    CoRR, 2003, v:0, n:, pp:- [Journal]
  147. Benoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm
    Effectiveness of Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    CoRR, 2002, v:0, n:, pp:- [Journal]
  148. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    CoRR, 2002, v:0, n:, pp:- [Journal]
  149. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    CoRR, 2002, v:0, n:, pp:- [Journal]
  150. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Complexity of Mechanism Design [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    CoRR, 2002, v:0, n:, pp:- [Journal]
  151. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    CoRR, 2002, v:0, n:, pp:- [Journal]
  152. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    CoRR, 2003, v:0, n:, pp:- [Journal]
  153. Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang, Tuomas Sandholm
    How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate? [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    CoRR, 2003, v:0, n:, pp:- [Journal]
  154. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    CoRR, 2003, v:0, n:, pp:- [Journal]
  155. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Complexity of Determining Nonemptiness of the Core [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    CoRR, 2003, v:0, n:, pp:- [Journal]
  156. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    CoRR, 2003, v:0, n:, pp:- [Journal]
  157. Tuomas Sandholm, Kate Larson, Martin Andersson, Onn Shehory, Fernando Tohmé
    Anytime Coalition Structure Generation with Worst Case Guarantees [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    CoRR, 1998, v:0, n:, pp:- [Journal]
  158. Tuomas Sandholm
    Unenforced E-Commerce Transactions. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    IEEE Internet Computing, 1997, v:1, n:6, pp:47-54 [Journal]
  159. Tuomas Sandholm, Qianbo Huai
    Nomad: Mobile Agent System for an Internet-Based Auction House. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    IEEE Internet Computing, 2000, v:4, n:2, pp:80-86 [Journal]
  160. Avrim Blum, Tuomas Sandholm, Martin Zinkevich
    Online algorithms for market clearing. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    J. ACM, 2006, v:53, n:5, pp:845-879 [Journal]
  161. Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm
    Anytime coalition structure generation: an average case study. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    J. Exp. Theor. Artif. Intell., 2000, v:12, n:1, pp:23-42 [Journal]
  162. Avrim Blum, Jeffrey C. Jackson, Tuomas Sandholm, Martin Zinkevich
    Preference Elicitation and Query Learning. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    Journal of Machine Learning Research, 2004, v:5, n:, pp:649-667 [Journal]
  163. Fernando Tohmé, Tuomas Sandholm
    Coalition Formation Processes with Belief Revision among Bounded-rational Self-interested Agents. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    J. Log. Comput., 1999, v:9, n:6, pp:793-815 [Journal]
  164. Tuomas Sandholm
    Expressive commerce and its application to sourcing: how we conducted $35 billion of generalized combinatorial auctions. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ICEC, 2007, pp:349-350 [Conf]
  165. Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm, Troels Bjerre Sørensen
    Potential-Aware Automated Abstraction of Sequential Games, and Holistic Equilibrium Analysis of Texas Hold'em Poker. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI, 2007, pp:50-57 [Conf]
  166. Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, Tuomas Sandholm
    Automated Online Mechanism Design and Prophet Inequalities. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI, 2007, pp:58-65 [Conf]
  167. Tuomas Sandholm
    Expressive Commerce and Its Application to Sourcing: How We Conducted $25 Billion of Generalized Combinatorial Auctions. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAIM, 2007, pp:426- [Conf]
  168. David J. Abraham, Avrim Blum, Tuomas Sandholm
    Clearing algorithms for barter exchange markets: enabling nationwide kidney exchanges. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2007, pp:295-304 [Conf]
  169. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    Common Voting Rules as Maximum Likelihood Estimators. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    UAI, 2005, pp:145-152 [Conf]
  170. Tuomas Sandholm
    Perspectives on multiagent learning. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    Artif. Intell., 2007, v:171, n:7, pp:382-391 [Journal]
  171. Tuomas Sandholm
    Approaches to winner determination in combinatorial auctions. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    Decision Support Systems, 2000, v:28, n:1-2, pp:165-176 [Journal]
  172. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Jérôme Lang
    When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    J. ACM, 2007, v:54, n:3, pp:14- [Journal]
  173. Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm
    Lossless abstraction of imperfect information games. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    J. ACM, 2007, v:54, n:5, pp:- [Journal]
  174. Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
    AWESOME: A general multiagent learning algorithm that converges in self-play and learns a best response against stationary opponents. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    Machine Learning, 2007, v:67, n:1-2, pp:23-43 [Journal]

  175. First-Order Algorithm with O(ln(1/e)) Convergence for e-Equilibrium in Two-Person Zero-Sum Games. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  176. Expressive Banner Ad Auctions and Model-Based Online Optimization for Clearing. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  177. Computing Reserve Prices and Identifying the Value Distribution in Real-world Auctions with Market Disruptions. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  178. A Theory of Expressiveness in Mechanisms. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  179. Expectation-Based Versus Potential-Aware Automated Abstraction in Imperfect Information Games: An Experimental Comparison Using Poker. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  180. Envy Quotes and the Iterated Core-Selecting Combinatorial Auction. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  181. Automated Channel Abstraction for Advertising Auctions. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  182. Asymmetric Spite in Auctions. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  183. Better automated abstraction techniques for imperfect information games, with application to Texas Hold'em poker. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  184. A heads-up no-limit Texas Hold'em poker player: discretized betting models and automatically generated equilibrium-finding programs. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  185. Computing an approximate jam/fold equilibrium for 3-player no-limit Texas Hold'em tournaments. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  186. Solving two-person zero-sum repeated games of incomplete information. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  187. GS3 and Tartanian: game theory-based heads-up limit and no-limit Texas Hold'em poker-playing programs. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  188. Decision rules and decision markets. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  189. Speeding up gradient-based algorithms for sequential games. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  190. Finding approximate competitive equilibria: efficient and fair course allocation. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  191. When do markets with simple agents fail? [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  192. Computing equilibria by incorporating qualitative models? [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  193. Combinatorial auctions with externalities. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  194. 07431 Abstracts Collection - Computational Issues in Social Choice. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  195. 07431 Executive Summary - Computational Issues in Social Choice. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  196. How Pervasive Is the Myerson-Satterthwaite Impossibility? [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  197. Methodology for Designing Reasonably Expressive Mechanisms with Application to Ad Auctions. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  198. Online Stochastic Optimization in the Large: Application to Kidney Exchange. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  199. Computing Equilibria in Multiplayer Stochastic Games of Imperfect Information. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  200. A practical liquidity-sensitive automated market maker. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  201. Automated market-making in the large: the gates hillman prediction market. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  202. Gradient-Based Algorithms for Finding Nash Equilibria in Extensive Form Games. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  203. Better with Byzantine: Manipulation-Optimal Mechanisms. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  204. The impact of expressiveness on the effectiveness of privacy mechanisms for location-sharing. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


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