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David C. Parkes: [Publications] [Author Rank by year] [Co-authors] [Prefers] [Cites] [Cited by]

Publications of Author

  1. Laura Kang, David C. Parkes
    Passive verification of the strategyproofness of mechanisms in open environments. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ICEC, 2006, pp:19-30 [Conf]
  2. David C. Parkes, Michael O. Rabin, Stuart M. Shieber, C. A. Thorpe
    Practical secrecy-preserving, verifiably correct and trustworthy auctions. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ICEC, 2006, pp:70-81 [Conf]
  3. David C. Parkes, Grant Schoenebeck
    GROWRANGE: Anytime VCG-Based Mechanisms. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI, 2004, pp:34-41 [Conf]
  4. David C. Parkes, Lyle H. Ungar
    Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI/IAAI, 2000, pp:74-81 [Conf]
  5. David C. Parkes, Lyle H. Ungar
    Preventing Strategic Manipulation in Iterative Auctions: Proxy Agents and Price-Adjustment. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI/IAAI, 2000, pp:82-89 [Conf]
  6. David C. Parkes, Lyle H. Ungar
    An auction-based method for decentralized train scheduling. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    Agents, 2001, pp:43-50 [Conf]
  7. Adam I. Juda, David C. Parkes
    An Options-Based Method to Solve the Composability Problem in Sequential Auctions. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AMEC, 2004, pp:44-58 [Conf]
  8. Loizos Michael, David C. Parkes, Avi Pfeffer
    Specifying and Monitoring Market Mechanisms Using Rights and Obligations. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AMEC, 2004, pp:188-201 [Conf]
  9. David C. Parkes
    Price-Based Information Certificates for Minimal-Revelation Combinatorial Auctions. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AMEC, 2002, pp:103-122 [Conf]
  10. William E. Walsh, David C. Parkes, Rajarshi Das
    Choosing Samples to Compute Heuristic-Strategy Nash Equilibrium. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AMEC, 2003, pp:109-123 [Conf]
  11. David C. Parkes, Lyle H. Ungar, Dean P. Foster
    Accounting for Cognitive Costs in On-Line Auction Design. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AMET, 1998, pp:25-40 [Conf]
  12. Takayuki Ito, David C. Parkes
    Instantiating the contingent bids model of truthful interdependent value auctions. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAMAS, 2006, pp:1151-1158 [Conf]
  13. David C. Parkes, Jeffrey Shneidman
    Distributed Implementations of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAMAS, 2004, pp:261-268 [Conf]
  14. Adrian Petcu, Boi Faltings, David C. Parkes
    MDPOP: faithful distributed implementation of efficient social choice problems. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAMAS, 2006, pp:1397-1404 [Conf]
  15. David C. Parkes
    Computational Mechanism Design: An AI Agenda. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    BNAIC, 2005, pp:3-10 [Conf]
  16. Sébastien Lahaie, Florin Constantin, David C. Parkes
    More on the Power of Demand Queries in Combinatorial Auctions: Learning Atomic Languages and Handling Incentives. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    IJCAI, 2005, pp:959-964 [Conf]
  17. David C. Parkes
    Optimal Auction Design for Agents with Hard Valuation Problems. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce (IJCAI Workshop), 1999, pp:206-219 [Conf]
  18. David C. Parkes, Jayant Kalagnanam, Marta Eso
    Achieving Budget-Balance with Vickrey-Based Payment Schemes in Exchanges. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    IJCAI, 2001, pp:1161-1168 [Conf]
  19. Jeffrey Shneidman, David C. Parkes
    Rationality and Self-Interest in Peer to Peer Networks. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    IPTPS, 2003, pp:139-148 [Conf]
  20. David C. Parkes, Satinder P. Singh
    An MDP-Based Approach to Online Mechanism Design. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    NIPS, 2003, pp:- [Conf]
  21. David C. Parkes, Satinder P. Singh, Dimah Yanovsky
    Approximately Efficient Online Mechanism Design. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    NIPS, 2004, pp:- [Conf]
  22. Jacomo Corbo, David C. Parkes
    The price of selfish behavior in bilateral network formation. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    PODC, 2005, pp:99-107 [Conf]
  23. Jeffrey Shneidman, David C. Parkes
    Specification faithfulness in networks with rational nodes. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    PODC, 2004, pp:88-97 [Conf]
  24. Adam I. Juda, David C. Parkes
    The sequential auction problem on eBay: an empirical analysis and a solution. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2006, pp:180-189 [Conf]
  25. Eric J. Friedman, David C. Parkes
    Pricing WiFi at Starbucks: issues in online mechanism design. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2003, pp:240-241 [Conf]
  26. Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, Mohammad Mahdian, David C. Parkes
    Online auctions with re-usable goods. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2005, pp:165-174 [Conf]
  27. Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, David C. Parkes
    Adaptive limited-supply online auctions. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2004, pp:71-80 [Conf]
  28. Anshul Kothari, David C. Parkes, Subhash Suri
    Approximately-strategyproof and tractable multi-unit auctions. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2003, pp:166-175 [Conf]
  29. Sébastien Lahaie, David C. Parkes
    Applying learning algorithms to preference elicitation. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2004, pp:180-188 [Conf]
  30. Jeffrey Shneidman, David C. Parkes
    Using redundancy to improve robustness of distributed mechanism implementations. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2003, pp:276-277 [Conf]
  31. Aditya V. Sunderam, David C. Parkes
    Preference elicitation in proxied multiattribute auctions. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2003, pp:214-215 [Conf]
  32. Chaki Ng, David C. Parkes, Margo I. Seltzer
    Virtual worlds: fast and strategyproof auctions for dynamic resource allocation. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2003, pp:238-239 [Conf]
  33. David C. Parkes
    iBundle: an efficient ascending price bundle auction. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 1999, pp:148-157 [Conf]
  34. David C. Parkes, Ruggiero Cavallo, Nick Elprin, Adam I. Juda, Sébastien Lahaie, Benjamin Lubin, Loizos Michael, Jeffrey Shneidman, Hassan Sultan
    ICE: an iterative combinatorial exchange. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2005, pp:249-258 [Conf]
  35. David C. Parkes
    Auction design with costly preference elicitation. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    Ann. Math. Artif. Intell., 2005, v:44, n:3, pp:269-302 [Journal]
  36. Anshul Kothari, David C. Parkes, Subhash Suri
    Approximately-strategyproof and tractable multiunit auctions. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    Decision Support Systems, 2005, v:39, n:1, pp:105-121 [Journal]
  37. David C. Parkes
    Special Issue of Decision Support Systems on the Fourth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    Decision Support Systems, 2005, v:39, n:1, pp:1-2 [Journal]
  38. Rajdeep K. Dash, Nicholas R. Jennings, David C. Parkes
    Computational-Mechanism Design: A Call to Arms. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    IEEE Intelligent Systems, 2003, v:18, n:6, pp:40-47 [Journal]
  39. Jacomo Corbo, Antoni Calvó-Armengol, David C. Parkes
    A study of Nash equilibrium in contribution games for peer-to-peer networks. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    Operating Systems Review, 2006, v:40, n:3, pp:61-66 [Journal]
  40. David C. Parkes, Quang Duong
    An Ironing-Based Approach to Adaptive Online Mechanism Design in Single-Valued Domains. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    AAAI, 2007, pp:94-101 [Conf]
  41. Geoff Mainland, David C. Parkes, Matt Welsh
    Decentralized, Adaptive Resource Allocation for Sensor Networks. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    NSDI, 2005, pp:- [Conf]
  42. Jonathan Bredin, David C. Parkes
    Models for Truthful Online Double Auctions. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    UAI, 2005, pp:50-59 [Conf]
  43. Ruggiero Cavallo, David C. Parkes, Satinder P. Singh
    Optimal Coordinated Planning Amongst Self-Interested Agents with Private State. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    UAI, 2006, pp:- [Conf]

  44. Expressive Banner Ad Auctions and Model-Based Online Optimization for Clearing. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  45. Computing Reserve Prices and Identifying the Value Distribution in Real-world Auctions with Market Disruptions. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  46. Partially Synchronized DEC-MDPs in Dynamic Mechanism Design. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  47. Efficient Metadeliberation Auctions. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  48. Value-Based Policy Teaching with Active Indirect Elicitation. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  49. Economic Hierarchical Q-Learning. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  50. An Expressive Auction Design for Online Display Advertising. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  51. Tolerable Manipulability in Dynamic Assignment without Money. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  52. Truth, Justice, and Cake Cutting. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  53. Hidden Market Design. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  54. Automated Channel Abstraction for Advertising Auctions. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  55. Accounting Mechanisms for Distributed Work Systems. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  56. Online auctions for bidders with interdependent values. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  57. On Revenue-Optimal Dynamic Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  58. Hybrid transitive trust mechanisms. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  59. On non-cooperative location privacy: a game-theoretic analysis. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  60. Dynamic Matching with a Fall-back Option. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  61. Cryptographic Securities Exchanges. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  62. Cryptographic Combinatorial Securities Exchanges. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  63. Cryptographic Combinatorial Clock-Proxy Auctions. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  64. Why Markets Could (But Don't Currently) Solve Resource Allocation Problems in Systems. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  65. Expressive Power-Based Resource Allocation for Data Centers. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  66. A General Approach to Environment Design with One Agent. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  67. An Economically-Principled Generative Model of AS Graph Connectivity. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  68. The role of game theory in human computation systems. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  69. A market-based approach to software evolution. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  70. Handling interdependent values in an auction mechanism for bandwidth allocation in tactical data networks. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  71. On the communication requirements of verifying the VCG outcome. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  72. Policy teaching through reward function learning. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  73. Self-correcting sampling-based dynamic multi-unit auctions. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  74. Designing incentives for online question and answer forums. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  75. Using virtual markets to program global behavior in sensor networks. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  76. When Analysis Fails: Heuristic Mechanism Design via Self-correcting Procedures. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  77. Fairness with an Honest Minority and a Rational Majority. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  78. Learning and Solving Many-Player Games through a Cluster-Based Representation. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  79. A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Games with a Purpose. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  80. The Importance of Network Topology in Local Contribution Games. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  81. Fair Package Assignment. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  82. Specifying and monitoring economic environments using rights and obligations. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  83. An options-based solution to the sequential auction problem. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  84. Computational challenges in e-commerce. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  85. Strong activity rules for iterative combinatorial auctions. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  86. Minimal Economic Distributed Computing [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  87. Practical secrecy-preserving, verifiably correct and trustworthy auctions. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


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