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Shahar Dobzinski: [Publications] [Author Rank by year] [Co-authors] [Prefers] [Cites] [Cited by]

Publications of Author

  1. Liad Blumrosen, Shahar Dobzinski
    Welfare maximization in congestion games. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2006, pp:52-61 [Conf]
  2. Shahar Dobzinski, Michael Schapira
    An improved approximation algorithm for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    SODA, 2006, pp:1064-1073 [Conf]
  3. Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, Michael Schapira
    Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    STOC, 2005, pp:610-618 [Conf]
  4. Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, Michael Schapira
    Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    STOC, 2006, pp:644-652 [Conf]
  5. Shahar Dobzinski
    Two Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    APPROX-RANDOM, 2007, pp:89-103 [Conf]
  6. Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan
    Mechanisms for multi-unit auctions. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2007, pp:346-351 [Conf]
  7. Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan
    Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP]
    STOC, 2007, pp:338-344 [Conf]

  8. Multi-unit Auctions with Budget Limits. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  9. Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  10. On the Power of Randomization in Algorithmic Mechanism Design. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  11. On characterizations of truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions and scheduling. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  12. An optimal lower bound for anonymous scheduling mechanisms. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  13. Frequent Manipulability of Elections: The Case of Two Voters. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  14. Is Shapley Cost Sharing Optimal? [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  15. Prompt Mechanisms for Online Auctions. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  16. A Modular Approach to Roberts' Theorem. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  17. On the Power of Randomization in Algorithmic Mechanism Design [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  18. A Note on the Power of Truthful Approximation Mechanisms [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  19. Multi-Unit Auctions: Beyond Roberts [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


  20. Approximations by Computationally-Efficient VCG-Based Mechanisms. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP]


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