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Tim Roughgarden :
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Shuchi Chawla , Tim Roughgarden Single-Source Stochastic Routing. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] APPROX-RANDOM, 2006, pp:82-94 [Conf ] Elliot Anshelevich , Anirban Dasgupta , Jon M. Kleinberg , Éva Tardos , Tom Wexler , Tim Roughgarden The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] FOCS, 2004, pp:295-304 [Conf ] Anupam Gupta , Amit Kumar , Martin Pál , Tim Roughgarden Approximation Via Cost-Sharing: A Simple Approximation Algorithm for the Multicommodity Rent-or-Buy Problem. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] FOCS, 2003, pp:606-0 [Conf ] Amit Kumar , Anupam Gupta , Tim Roughgarden A Constant-Factor Approximation Algorithm for the Multicommodity. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] FOCS, 2002, pp:333-0 [Conf ] Tim Roughgarden Designing Networks for Selfish Users is Hard. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] FOCS, 2001, pp:472-481 [Conf ] Tim Roughgarden , Éva Tardos How Bad is Selfish Routing? [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] FOCS, 2000, pp:93-102 [Conf ] Henry Lin , Tim Roughgarden , Éva Tardos , Asher Walkover Braess's Paradox, Fibonacci Numbers, and Exponential Inapproximability. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] ICALP, 2005, pp:497-512 [Conf ] Fabián A. Chudak , Tim Roughgarden , David P. Williamson Approximate k-MSTs and k-Steiner Trees via the Primal-Dual Method and Lagrangean Relaxation. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] IPCO, 2001, pp:60-70 [Conf ] Richard Cole , Yevgeniy Dodis , Tim Roughgarden How much can taxes help selfish routing? [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2003, pp:98-107 [Conf ] Greg Valiant , Tim Roughgarden Braess's paradox in large random graphs. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2006, pp:296-305 [Conf ] Richard Cole , Yevgeniy Dodis , Tim Roughgarden Bottleneck links, variable demand, and the tragedy of the commons. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] SODA, 2006, pp:668-677 [Conf ] Henry Lin , Tim Roughgarden , Éva Tardos A stronger bound on Braess's Paradox. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] SODA, 2004, pp:340-341 [Conf ] Tim Roughgarden The maximum latency of selfish routing. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] SODA, 2004, pp:980-981 [Conf ] Tim Roughgarden Selfish routing with atomic players. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] SODA, 2005, pp:1184-1185 [Conf ] Christos H. Papadimitriou , Tim Roughgarden Computing equilibria in multi-player games. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] SODA, 2005, pp:82-91 [Conf ] Tim Roughgarden How unfair is optimal routing? [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] SODA, 2002, pp:203-204 [Conf ] Ho-Lin Chen , Tim Roughgarden Network design with weighted players. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] SPAA, 2006, pp:29-38 [Conf ] Richard Cole , Yevgeniy Dodis , Tim Roughgarden Pricing network edges for heterogeneous selfish users. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] STOC, 2003, pp:521-530 [Conf ] Anupam Gupta , Amit Kumar , Tim Roughgarden Simpler and better approximation algorithms for network design. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] STOC, 2003, pp:365-372 [Conf ] Tim Roughgarden Stackelberg scheduling strategies. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] STOC, 2001, pp:104-113 [Conf ] Tim Roughgarden The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] STOC, 2002, pp:428-437 [Conf ] Tim Roughgarden , Mukund Sundararajan New trade-offs in cost-sharing mechanisms. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] STOC, 2006, pp:79-88 [Conf ] Shuchi Chawla , Tim Roughgarden , Mukund Sundararajan Optimal Cost-Sharing Mechanisms for Steiner Forest Problems. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] WINE, 2006, pp:112-123 [Conf ] Mihaela Enachescu , Yashar Ganjali , Ashish Goel , Nick McKeown , Tim Roughgarden Part III: routers with very small buffers. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] Computer Communication Review, 2005, v:35, n:3, pp:83-90 [Journal ] Mitul Saha , Tim Roughgarden , Jean-Claude Latombe , Gildardo Sánchez-Ante Planning Tours of Robotic Arms among Partitioned Goals. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] I. J. Robotic Res., 2006, v:25, n:3, pp:207-223 [Journal ] Alan J. Hoffman , Kate Jenkins , Tim Roughgarden On a game in directed graphs. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] Inf. Process. Lett., 2002, v:83, n:1, pp:13-16 [Journal ] Tim Roughgarden , Éva Tardos How bad is selfish routing? [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] J. ACM, 2002, v:49, n:2, pp:236-259 [Journal ] Richard Cole , Yevgeniy Dodis , Tim Roughgarden How much can taxes help selfish routing? [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] J. Comput. Syst. Sci., 2006, v:72, n:3, pp:444-467 [Journal ] Tim Roughgarden The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] J. Comput. Syst. Sci., 2003, v:67, n:2, pp:341-364 [Journal ] Tim Roughgarden On the severity of Braess's Paradox: Designing networks for selfish users is hard. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] J. Comput. Syst. Sci., 2006, v:72, n:5, pp:922-953 [Journal ] Fabián A. Chudak , Tim Roughgarden , David P. Williamson Approximate k -MSTs and k -Steiner trees via the primal-dual method and Lagrangean relaxation. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] Math. Program., 2004, v:100, n:2, pp:411-421 [Journal ] Tim Roughgarden Stackelberg Scheduling Strategies. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] SIAM J. Comput., 2004, v:33, n:2, pp:332-350 [Journal ] Mihaela Enachescu , Yashar Ganjali , Ashish Goel , Nick McKeown , Tim Roughgarden Routers with Very Small Buffers. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] INFOCOM, 2006, pp:- [Conf ] Tim Roughgarden , Mukund Sundararajan Optimal Efficiency Guarantees for Network Design Mechanisms. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] IPCO, 2007, pp:469-483 [Conf ] Aranyak Mehta , Tim Roughgarden , Mukund Sundararajan Beyond moulin mechanisms. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2007, pp:1-10 [Conf ] Damon Mosk-Aoyama , Tim Roughgarden , Devavrat Shah Fully Distributed Algorithms for Convex Optimization Problems. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] DISC, 2007, pp:492-493 [Conf ] Tim Roughgarden , Mukund Sundararajan Approximately Efficient Cost-Sharing Mechanisms [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] CoRR, 2006, v:0, n:, pp:- [Journal ] Anupam Gupta , Amit Kumar , Martin Pál , Tim Roughgarden Approximation via cost sharing: Simpler and better approximation algorithms for network design. [Citation Graph (0, 0)][DBLP ] J. ACM, 2007, v:54, n:3, pp:11- [Journal ] Weighted Congestion Games: Price of Anarchy, Universal Worst-Case Examples, and Tightness. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Worst-Case Efficiency Analysis of Queueing Disciplines. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Algorithmic Game Theory: Some Greatest Hits and Future Directions. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Lightweight Coloring and Desynchronization for Networks. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Revenue maximization with a single sample. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Simple versus optimal mechanisms. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Revenue submodularity. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Metric clustering via consistent labeling. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Designing networks with good equilibria. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Optimal mechanism design and money burning. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Universally utility-maximizing privacy mechanisms. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Interactive privacy via the median mechanism. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Is Shapley Cost Sharing Optimal? [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Bertrand Competition in Networks. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Revenue Submodularity. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Algorithmic game theory. [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Optimal Mechansim Design and Money Burning [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Universally Utility-Maximizing Privacy Mechanisms [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] The Median Mechanism: Interactive and Efficient Privacy with Multiple Queries [Citation Graph (, )][DBLP ] Search in 0.005secs, Finished in 0.308secs